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Special Problems of Custody
for Unaccompanied Refugee
Children in the United States
Ellen J. Durkee*
The law presumes that children are incomplete beings during the whole
period of their development. It views children as needing direct, intimate,
and continuous care by adults. I Children's inability to maintain life with-
out extraneous aid justifies their assignment to their biological parents, or,
where this natural relationship fails, to parental substitutes designated by
court proceedings. 2 In theory, some person or institution is always in
custody of a child. 3 But in the case of unaccompanied refugee children,
4
"the minors fall into the no man's land between U.S. immigration law and
state child welfare law." 
5
The refugee child who enters the United States with his or her parents
or a similarly situated adult relative presents no problem of custody; 6 the
parents or relative assume custody without judicial intervention. 7 But
government intervention is necessary to provide an unaccompanied ref-
ugee child with a parent substitute. A judicial custodial determination for
an unaccompanied refugee child poses problems that do not arise in a
similar determination for an American child. For example, refugee children
often gain admittance to the United States before completion of arrange-
ments for their legal and financial responsibility. 8 Determining who
among various government and private entities is to assume the long-term
financial responsibility for unaccompanied refugee children slows the legal
custody procedures. 9 Even when the delays pass and a child is successfully
placed, 10 another problem peculiar to refugees may arise. The refugee
child may have natural parents and relatives living in another country who
are impossible to locate or communicate with at the time the court makes
a custody determination. 11 The family may reappear at a later date and
seek to assert custodial control over the child. 12
Part I of this note provides an overview of federal legislation regarding
admissions of unaccompanied refugee children. Part II describes various
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obstacles to a smooth transition from the child's admission into the United
States to his or her placement by a state court with a permanent legal
custodian who ensures that the child receives care and supervision. Prob-
lems in this area frequently result from uncertainties regarding long-term
financial responsibility for the child. Also common are procedural difficul-
ties in introducing unaccompanied refugee children into state child welfare
systems. Part III then focuses on conflicts arising after the child's place-
ment, when the family either seeks the child's repatriation or follows the
child to the United States and attempts to regain custody.
Part IV evaluates the effect of the Refugee Act of 198013 on these issues.
Because the Act explicitly assigns interim legal and financial responsibility
for unaccompanied children to the director of refugee resettlement, 14 it
promises to resolve the issue of responsibility in the no-man's land be-
tween admission and placement. The Refugee Act also solves questions of
uncertain financial responsibility for unaccompanied refugee children by
assuring continued federal support until the child reaches majority. 15 The
Act has little effect, however, on custodial battles involving the natural
family of unaccompanied minors.
The topics discussed in this note are not the exclusive problems which
must be addressed in order to provide the most effective aid to an unac-
companied refugee child. Radical cultural adjustments, loss of natural
family members, and the ordeals experienced prior to or during flight from
the country of origin create enormous psychological stress for these chil-
dren. 16 Exploration of living arrangements and resettlement patterns to
accommodate their special psychological needs is warranted. These mat-
ters fall outside the scope of this note, which highlights but one aspect of
the resettlement experience-the legal process for determining and adjust-
ing custody. While only one problem among many facing unaccompanied
refugee children, it stands out as the most crucial issue of law, and one of
the most important determinants of a refugee child's fate in the United
States.
ADMISSION OF REFUGEE CHILDREN
INTO THE UNITED STATES
Immigration Classification of Refugee Children
Admitted Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980
Prior to the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), 17 the statute limited the number of immigrants who could enter the
United States during any one year and distributed the annual overall quota
among various geographical areas. 18 Out of concern for alien orphans,
Congress repeatedly authorized issuance of special nonquota visas for
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them thereby avoiding extended waiting periods caused by oversubscrip-
tion of certain quotas. 19 Among other reforms, the 1965 amendments
abolished the national origins quota system after a transition period ending
June 30, 1968. 20 However, the total number of immigrants admitted to the
United States remained subject to numerical quotas with visas allocated
according to seven preference categories. 21 After elimination of the na-
tional origins quota system, most unaccompanied refugee children were
admitted to the United States either by the attorney general's parole pow-
er, 22 or under the seventh preference category reserved for "conditional
entrants." 23
The admission of a refugee by parole was strictly discretionary and
under the United States attorney general's control. The INA empowered
the attorney general to waive the Act's normal entry requirements in
emergencies for reasons of the public interest. In addition, the attorney
general could prescribe conditions to which the parolee's admission was
subject. 24 While parole was not admission for permanent residence, under
certain circumstances a parolee could adjust his or her status to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for residence. 25
Parole authority under the INA has existed since 1952. It was first
exercised to admit orphans in 1956.26 Parole soon became a customary
vehicle to admit groups of refugees. 27 The largest such groups were the
Cubans and Indochinese, 28 both of which included numerous unaccom-
panied children. 29
Besides parole, the INA provided for the conditional entry of 17,900
refugees a year under the INA seventh preference category. 30 Because
numerical and geographical limitations31 restricted this category, its use
was less frequent than parole in admitting unaccompanied children. 32
A third admission category, for immediate relatives, permitted entry of
orphans who were to be adopted by United States citizens. 33 Such or-
phans, though not subsumed under the definition of unaccompanied ref-
ugee children used in this note, nevertheless deserve notice in this
discussion. Many Vietnamese children brought to the United States prior
to the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 entered under an immediate relative
visa.3 4 Relatively few problems of legal responsibility arose for these
orphans. American adoption agencies established in the country of origin
carefully arranged for the orphan's immigration and required adopting
parents to agree to assume financial responsibility for the child. 35 Howev-
er, in the last month before the North Vietnamese takeover of Saigon, over
2,000 orphans were admitted to the United States by parole. 36 Multiple
lawsuits erupted from this evacuation; they are discussed further infra, as
illustrations of suits to regain custody brought by the natural families of
refugee children. 37
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Admission Under the Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 retains the attorney general's authority to parole
an alien into the United States, but Congress now clearly intends to dis-
courage its use for admitting groups of refugees. 38 The Act also leaves
intact the section permitting entry as an immediate relative of an orphan
to be adopted by a United States citizen.
A significant change lies in the elimination of the conditional entrant
category 39 and the creation of a new admission category, termed "ref-
ugees." 40 The term refers to an alien who is outside the United States when
granted admission. 41 In contrast, an alien who is a refugee within the
meaning of the Act but who is physically present in the United States, or
at a land border or port of entry, may be granted asylum status. 42 Prior
to the Refugee Act, no statute explicitly permitted such a status. Federal
immigration regulations, however, provided a procedure for application
for asylum. 43 In addition, an INA provision authorized withholding
deportation of an alien who would be subject to persecution, 44 and so
provided a de facto form of asylum. This de facto form of asylum continues
under the Refugee Act, with certain amendments. 45
Although a child may be granted asylum derivatively through his or her
parent's asylum status, 46 the Refugee Act also extends asylum to children
who petition in their own right; "an alien," no age specified, may seek
asylum. 47
In addition to the asylum and refugee statuses created by the Refugee
Act, another related status was administratively created shortly after the
Act was passed. Following an incident at the Peruvian embassy in Cuba
in April 1980, 117,000 Cubans fled to the United States by boat. 48 Rather
than admit them as refugees under the emergency provisions of the Ref-
ugee Act, 49 President Carter chose to parole these Cubans into the United
States as individual applicants for political asylum. so "Subsequently, the
administration created a special status for these Cubans, as well as certain
Haitian refugees, known as "Cuban/Haitian (status pending)." 5 1
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEE CHILDREN:
TWO EXAMPLES OF CONFUSION AND DELAY
The legal problems facing the unaccompanied refugee child are not re-
solved simply by his or her admission to the United States. In the period
between formal admission and the time that an individual or agency as-
sumes legal responsibility for the child, a gap may exist during which the
child has no legal custodian. 52 The undesirability of this lapse in legal
responsibility is evident, for example, when a child requires serious medi-
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cal attention. Without a designated custodian, authorizing and paying for
medical treatment is an administrative quagmire.
Confusion about who will assume financial responsibility frequently
delays the child's placement. 53 Most unaccompanied refugee children
become candidates for foster care 5 4 financed directly by a local or state
agency or indirectly by the federal government. .5 The onerous financial
burden of maintaining a child is a major obstacle to a smooth transition
from admission to the assumption of legal responsibility under a court's
protective supervision. Neither the states (through their social service de-
partments) nor the voluntary agencies 5 6 which arrange for foster care are
required by law to accept responsibility for the children. Understandably,
they have been reluctant to add refugee resettlement costs to their already
overburdened programs without some guarantee of federal reimburse-
ment. 
5 7
Prior to the Refugee Act, the federal government enacted numerous bills
appropriating funds for the care and maintenance of refugee children. 58
This legislation was piecemeal and always temporary. Hence the funding
problem recurred with each new refugee crisis. In addition, numerous
procedural problems have hampered the placement of unaccompanied
refugee children. The U.S. experiences with both the Indochinese and the
recent group of refugees from Cuba provide illustrations of these prob-
lems.
The Indochinese Experience
The establishment of legal responsibility for Indochinese unaccompanied
minors was initially done on an ad hoc basis. The influx of Vietnamese
refugees in 1975 appeared to many as a unique emergency situation for
which temporary special procedures were appropriate. 59 When the flow of
Indochinese refugee children continued, the need for uniform procedures
became apparent.
In April and May 1975, with South Vietnam's fall imminent, the federal
government paroled over 2,000 Vietnamese orphans into the United States
at the request of adopting parents and voluntary agencies arranging for
American adoptions of Vietnamese orphans. A massive airlift, dubbed
"Operation Babylift," rapidly evacuated the children. Before the children
left Vietnam, voluntary agencies (volags) obtained documents releasing
the children for adoption and establishing legal custody with the agen-
cies. 60 The children therefore had a legal custodian when they arrived.
Arrangements for adoption or foster care in the United States then pro-
ceeded through these agencies. 61
In the summer of 1975, approximately 700 unaccompanied Indochinese
refugee children arrived in the United States. They were initially detained
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in four military camps set up as reception centers for Vietnamese refugees.
At the outset, some of the children left the camps with unrelated sponsors
without assignment of legal custody. This confusion ended when each
camp established independent procedures for the release of the children.
At one camp, the public welfare department of the surrounding county
took responsibility for resettling the refugee children. 62 At another camp,
the county juvenile court took custody of the minors, and then transferred
custody to the responsible agency or individual when the minor was reset-
tled. 63 After passage of authorizing legislation, 64 the federal government
bore the full costs of the child welfare services where requested. Reacting
compassionately to the plight of the children, some states and foster care
families declined to seek federal reimbursement. 65
Beginning in late 1977, a second group of unaccompanied Indochinese
minors began to trickle into the United States. Most were "boat people"
processed through camps in Asia. 66 Several national religious and service
organizations, most notably the United States Catholic Conference and the
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, contracted with the federal
government to resettle the minors. 67 After processing in the Asian camps,
the children were flown directly to their destination in the United
States. 68
Once they arrived in the United States, legal responsibility for the
children became a matter of conflict between the volags and the state
courts. The volags worked directly with the state child welfare agencies to
place and establish legal responsibility for each child. By not transferring
custody to state child welfare agencies, some juvenile and family courts
attempted to burden the volags with permanent legal responsibility for the
minors, although their contractual commitments were not so extensive. 69
By the summer of 1978, the resettlement volags refused to bring any more
minors into the United States until the federal government made clear who
would assume responsibility for them. 70
In response to the stalemate, a federal policy transmittal, issued on
February 6, 1979 by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW-now Health and Human Services, HHS), which was responsible
for the refugee resettlement program, to the state administrators of child
welfare services, stated that:
[A]rrangements [should be] made whereby the State or local public agency
establishes legal responsibility for the care and maintenance of the unaccom-
panied minor. The purpose of establishing legal responsibility is to insure
that the unaccompanied children receive the full range of assistance, care and
services and to designate a legal authority to act in place of the child's
unavailable parent(s). This action should follow the process normally re-
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quired by State law to establish protective legal responsibility for a minor
child. 71
This policy nearly always results in legal responsibility vesting in the state
child welfare agency, thereby assuring that the child receives the full range
of benefits. 72 HHS guarantees federal reimbursement for foster care pay-
ments on a dollar for dollar basis, 73 which makes states more willing to
accept the children for placement. 74
Also in early 1979, the state agencies and volags began using the proce-
dural framework of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children
to place the Indochinese children. The Compact, a uniform law adopted in
forty-six states, 7 5 is aimed at facilitating the out-of-state placement of
children over whom a state court has acquired jurisdiction. 76 Although the
Compact was originally adopted for strictly domestic purposes, state ad-
ministrators' familiarity with its mechanisms made it suitable for refugee
placement. 77 Its uniform procedures greatly improve the transfer of legal
responsibility from the volags (acting on behalf of the federal government)
to a state or local public agency.
The Compact ensures that nationwide placement is accomplished with
the same safeguards as placement within a given state. The "sending
agency" 78 is assured that a proper living arrangement is found and that the
agency or foster parent in the receiving state is meeting its responsibilities
to the child. The receiving state is assured sufficient advance information
to make a suitable placement. Unless other arrangements are made, the
sending agency bears the ultimate financial responsibility for meeting the
child's needs. 79
Special forms and streamlined procedures have been developed to pro-
cess unaccompanied refugee children. For example, ordinarily the Compact
fixes financial responsibility in the sending agency. But with refugee chil-
dren, the national volags (the sending agencies) are not responsible for the
children after they are placed in the receiving state. Reports which would
be sent to the sending agency if the child were American are instead sent
to the Social Security Administration. The basic document for Interstate
Compact placement has been modified to provide additional information
for HHS purposes. 80
The Compact placement for refugee children can be broken down as
follows:
(1) The national volag initiates a request for placement.
(2) A local affiliate agency determines whether it can accept the child
for placement. This determination involves arranging for a suitable
foster care facility.
(3) The Compact administrator for the prospective receiving state pro-
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cesses the request for placement. Before accepting the child, the
administrator assures that provisions have been made for the local
court to assign custody and for care and service arrangements to be
completed.
(4) After the child arrives, the local affiliate agency notifies both the
Interstate Compact office in the receiving state and the national
volag that the child has arrived and legal responsibility has been
established. 81
After a child is placed, there is the possibility that a more suitable
placement opportunity with relatives, friends, or a foster family will be
identified. If the new placement is out of state, routine Compact proce-
dures apply. Once the child has been physically placed through Compact
procedures, the Office of Refugee Affairs must be notified. 82 Although
normally the Compact fixes financial responsibility in the sending state, a
receiving state may accept the responsibility. 83 The American Public Wel-
fare Association, which includes the National Association of Compact
Administrators, advises acceptance by the receiving state in the case of
refugee children. This is preferable because: (1) the availability of 100
percent federal funding for the children means that the receiving state
incurs no direct costs; (2) a child usually has no ties with the sending state;
and (3) monitoring of the child is facilitated by close proximity to the court
assuming legal responsibility. 84
The child is the ultimate beneficiary of the more efficient procedure
provided by the Compact. Advance planning results in more suitable
placement alternatives. The clarification of financial and legal responsibili-
ty assures that a child will not be deprived of any benefits an American
child would receive.
The 1980 Cuban Experience
Over 700 unaccompanied minors were among the 122,000 Cuban refugees
who arrived in the United States by boat in the spring and summer of
1980.85 The suddenness of the migration precluded advance arrangements
for placing the Cuban children. 86 The children, admitted by parole, 87 were
initially based in temporary federal camps. For nearly five months they
were victims of abuse by other refugees and federal security officials in
these camps while awaiting placement. 88 Minors were detained longer
than most adult refugees because of the "red tape" and confusion about
transferring legal responsibility to a child welfare agency. 89 The lack of
financial guarantees from the federal government also hindered the as-
sumption of responsibility by states. 90
To deal with these problems, a new approach to placement developed.
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A Presidential Directive in September 1980 directed the INS to retain legal
custody of the minors. 91 States, acting as agents for the INS, were to
arrange for placement in foster care. 92 The passage of the Fascell-Stone
Amendment on October 10, 1980 93 clarified the financial responsibility by
bestowing on Cubans and Haitians benefits comparable to those they
would have received if admitted under the 1980 Refugee Act.
The management of the Cuban and Indochinese refugees illustrates that
the process for placing refugee children has not been uniform. With both
groups, questions of legal responsibility for unaccompanied minors had to
be dealt with as they arose. Solutions were formulated in response to
existing circumstances. Questions of financial responsibility had their
effect in creating reluctance on the part of both public and private agencies
to accept legal responsibility. Establishing uniform procedures would
eliminate the confusion and delay inherent in a system which merely
responds to crisis rather than planning for it. The role that the Refugee Act
will have in solving the problems encountered in delegating responsibility
for unaccompanied refugee children is assessed infra.
CUSTODY RIGHTS OF THE CHILD'S NATURAL FAMILY
Unaccompanied youths often immigrate as part of a family plan the ulti-
mate goal of which is eventual family reunion abroad. 94 To effectuate a
reunion, the after-arriving natural family must seek court review of the
child's custodial arrangements. Often the child's substitute parents wel-
come and facilitate the family's effort to transfer custody. 95 However, in
some instances, the child's custodian may contest the transfer. In a reversal
of the reluctant caretaker situation discussed in the last section, here the
court must choose between parties competing for the responsibilities of
custody.
In deciding to parole the Babylift refugee children into the United
States, the INS assumed that the children were orphans. In fact, some were
not. 96 Suits to regain custody were brought by both parents and rela-
tives. 97 Repatriation, too,was an objective of one of the Babylift lawsuits. 98
These cases illustrate three different aspects of the question of custody
rights of the natural family of a refugee child: (1) May the natural parents
who immigrate to the United States following their child's admission and
placement regain custody of their child? (2) May other relatives who
immigrate to the United States subsequent to the child's admission and
placement gain custody of the child? (3) Do parents have the right to force
repatriation of the child for the purpose of family unity?
206 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES
The Natural Family's Right
to Custody After Immigration
Applicable Law in Custody Disputes
Under American choice-of-law principles, the court with jurisdiction for
adoption for child custody purposes applies its own domestic law. 99
American law, as distinguished from civil law, disfavors choice-of-law
principles based on nationality. 100 However, the law of a refugee child's
country of origin or former domicile is relevant to some extent. For exam-
ple, a Vietnamese-born child may come before a United States court with
the same documentation that is routine in domestic adoptions-a birth
certificate or judgment, and a release of custody with consent to adopt.
However, the documents are in compliance with Vietnamese law rather
than United States law. Contrary to United States practice, Vietnamese law
permits an orphanage to release a child for adoption without verification
of the child's prior legal identity. 101 To facilitate adoption of foreign-born
children, one U.S. state's law provides that consent for adoption "be ac-
knowledged or conformable to the law and procedure of" the country in
which the consent is signed. 102 Courts also have discretion to grant comity
to, or recognize, foreign laws. 103
Of the cases arising out of the Babylift, only two raised the issue of
applicability of foreign law. In Hao Thi Popp v. Richard Lucas, 104 a Vietnamese
mother who followed her children to the United States attempted to regain
custody of two sons. During the Babylift, the mother had signed a docu-
ment relinquishing her custodial and parental rights and releasing the
children for adoption. The trial court found the document effective to
terminate the mother's parental rights. After weighing the relative suitabil-
ity of the parties as parents, the court awarded custody to the foster parent.
On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that the document
did not conform to the requirements of state law and rejected the argument
that the document was proper and irrevocable under Vietnamese law.
"Even if the relinquishment were irrevocable under Vietnamese law, we
would not afford comity to it. '[C]omity is a flexible doctrine, the applica-
tion of which rests in the discretion of the state where enforcement of a
foreign order is sought .... " 105 The case was remanded to the trial court
to reconsider custody without regard to the document terminating parental
rights. In this instance, the court's refusal to grant comity aided the natural
parent seeking custody. The tone of the court's opinion suggests that it was
seeking to effect a family reunion.
Conversely, in Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi 10 6 (discussed further in the follow-
ing section), the court's refusal to apply Vietnamese law worked against
relatives who attempted to gain custody of four Babylift children. The
plaintiffs argued that they had parental rights under a Vietnamese legal
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principle which vests parental rights in the extended family unit. The court
opted for domestic law after exploring choice-of-law principles and noting
the difficulty of ascertaining the law of South Vietnam at the time of its
conquest by the North. 1
07
In other similar cases, the issue of applicability of foreign law was not
ever raised. These cases and the two just described strongly suggest that
the international aspects of the situation or the nationality of the parties
will not deter courts from applying their own state law.
Federal Jurisdicion in Custody Disputes
Jurisdiction of child custody disputes has traditionally resided solely in
state courts. 108 Nevertheless, the refugee child's admission to the United
States at the sufferance of the federal government has led to assertions of
federal jurisdiction in several lawsuits involving Indochinese. 109
In Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 110 for example, the custody suit brought by a
grandmother and uncle of four Babylift children in foster care was ulti-
mately dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. Included in the four
groups of defendants, " I' who allegedly controlled the custody of the chil-
dren, were the attorney general and various officials in the INS. The major
plank in the plaintiffs' jurisdictional argument was federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction. Other bases included an assertion of a federal question 112 and
the Alien Tort Claims Act. 113 The attempt to establish federal jurisdiction
was in part motivated by a desire to circumvent Michigan's "best interests
standard" 114 applicable in disputes between nonparent parties. 11
5
Habeas corpus, as applied to infants, is an equitable summary proceed-
ing brought against the person with custody, which is designed to deter-
mine in whose custody the best interests of the child will be advanced. 11
6
In general, the court is not limited to an inquiry into the legal right by
which the child is held. 117 However in some jurisdictions, the applicant
for the writ must show a prima facie right to such custody. 11 Federal
courts do not have jurisdiction to make a custody determination every time
it is asserted that a person's custody is wrongful. 119 Federal jurisdiction is
created only pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States ...
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States .... 120
The plaintiffs in Huynh Thi Anh and the parents in a similar federal case,
Le Thi Sang v. Levi, 121 argued that their children, who entered the United
States as parolees, remained in the custody of the foster parents under
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authority of the federal government. This argument springs from the INA
provision authorizing parole:
A person on parole by the INS is not considered to be legally admitted to
the country. Rather he is deemed to be in custodial status, usually without
confinement, until an emergent situation ceases or until a right to enter the
United States is declared. [citations omitted] In exercising his parole power
the Attorney General, moreover, is authorized to attach to the granting of
parole "such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest .... 122
Federal habeas jurisdiction based on this power to prescribe conditions
of parole has not been sustained in custodial disputes where both parties
reside in the United States. 123 The courts rejected the argument that by
admitting the child by parole, the INS acquired a further duty, enforceable
by a writ of mandamus, to require removal of the children from foster
parents to ensure reunification with their relatives. They suggested instead
that the purpose of the immigration authorities' continuing supervision of
parolees is to ensure "prompt and safe return upon revocation of pa-
role." 1 24 The prescribed conditions of parole are intended to keep the INS
informed of the children's whereabouts while they remain in parole status.
"Any custody of the minor child which is consistent with state law is
acceptable to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, so long as the
[INS] is kept apprised of the whereabouts of the minor child." 125
Another reason for rejection of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in
Huynh Thi Anh was the failure of the plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies
before bringing the federal action. This ruling recognizes that state courts
are better suited to adjudicate child custody disputes, because of the tradi-
tional nature of domestic relations problems and the expertise of local
agencies in monitoring and resolving domestic matters. 126
The plaintiffs in Huynh Thi Anh also claimed that the defendants' con-
tinued custody violated the treaties of the United States, thus creating
habeas jurisdiction and jurisdiction as a federal question. 127 Because of the
generality of the language in the three international documents relied
on, 1 28 the court concluded that they did not create private rights of action
in domestic courts. 129
Yet another basis for the assertion of federal jurisdiction in Huynh Thi
Anh was the Alien Tort Claims Act. 130 The Act establishes a federal cause
of action for an alien for an injury committed "in violation of the law of
nations." 3 1 The plaintiffs claimed that international law recognized a
moral and biological custodial right favoring relatives over foster par-
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ents. 132 Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged, Vietnamese law gives natural
relatives greater rights than are recognized in U.S. law, and the United
States Government had a duty to prevent violation of Vietnamese law.
The Alien Tort Claims Act had been a sufficient basis for federal juris-
diction in one child custody dispute between divorced alien parents. 133
The mother, who was not entitled to custody under the law of the parents'
nationality, took the daughter from country to country under an improper
passport, thereby concealing the daughter's name and nationality. Federal
jurisdiction was predicated on the conclusion that misuse of a passport was
a wrongful act "in violation of the law of nations," which caused injury
to the daughter's father. However, in Huynh Thi Anh the court's conclusion
that no violation of international law had occurred necessarily led to a
rejection of federal jurisdiction under the Act. Specifically, the court reject-
ed jurisdiction under the Act because of the lack of an international law
principle which granted custody, as a matter of right, to nonparent rela-
tives over foster parents. The allegation based on Vietnamese law was
dismissed because choice-of-law principles required application of domes-
tic law. 134
Federal habeas jurisdiction might arise from the government's initial
detention of refugees in temporary domestic camps. Here the children
clearly are in custody under authority of the federal government. Yet,
federal custody litigation brought by the natural family during this stage
is unlikely. Detention in camps is generally brief enough that such litiga-
tion would not have time to develop. Moreover, by INS policy, children
are released to their natural parents whenever they can be located. 135
Standards for Determining the
Natural Family's Right to Custody
State courts apply the same criteria for determining the proper custodian
of a refugee child as they would in a dispute involving a native child. 1
36
Although every state's child custody code differs, the general goal of al
states is to make a custodial determination that serves the best interests of
the child. 137
Most states presume that the natural parents are the best custodians for
the child. 138 However, the courts are not in agreement as to the conse-
quence of this presumption. One view, the parental right doctrine, holds
that the parent is entitled to custody over all others unless the parent is
clearly unfit or has abandoned the child, or unless extraordinary circum-
stances require that the parent be deprived of custody. 139 Under a second
view the welfare or best interests of the child is the sole criterion for
custody. The fact that a parent is a suitable custodian does not entitle him
or her to custody, if the welfare of the child would be advanced by an
award to some other person. 140 The presumption that custody with the
210 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES
natural parents generally serves the best interests of the child is given some
weight. But under this view, there is more comparison of the relative
abilities of the parties competing for custody than with strict adherence to
the parental right doctrine. The conflict between the two approaches repre-
sents a difference in emphasis rather than a clash of opposing rules of
law. 141
Refugee parents have generally been successful in regaining custody, 1
42
but a return of custody is not automatic. Extensive litigation may result if
the child's current custodian resists the parents' efforts. Proof that the
natural parents did not intend to abandon a child or that a release for
adoption was invalid is not, by itself, sufficient to restore custody to the
parent. The court must also ask which custodian would best serve the
child's needs.
In In Re Hua, 143 a Babylift child had been in legal custody of the defen-
dant, Holt Adopting Program, Inc., and in the physical custody of foster
parents for five years. The mother had obtained a writ of habeas corpus
to regain custody, but the decision in her favor was reversed by the Ohio
Supreme Court. The court accepted the fact that the custody relinquish-
ment document had been signed by the mother under duress. However,
it remanded the case for consideration of evidence regarding the suitability
of the mother and the best interests of the child. "Where the writ is sought
for the detention of the child, the weight of authority holds that the court
should be concerned more with the welfare of the child than with the
illegality of the detention." 1
44
The return of custody to the natural parents is not necessarily automatic
even if the parent never intended to relinquish custody. An Iowa decision,
Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 145 placed great importance on testimony
concerning the relative merits of the natural mother and foster parents
before restoring custody to the mother.
The success of refugee parents in regaining custody may depend, to
some extent, on which view-the parental rights doctrine or the best
interests test-the court emphasizes. Frequently in domestic child custody
disputes, the language and legal theory relied on by a court are inseparable
from the facts of the case. For example, if a child has been separated from
the parent for a long time, custody is commonly left in the third party on
the ground that this serves the child's best interests. But if the separation
is brief, the parent will prevail on the parental rights theory. 146
If a court places more emphasis on the best interests test than on paren-
tal rights, refugee parents may have difficulty regaining custody. Generally
an American foster family will be in a superior financial position to care
for the child. Furthermore, as the time between the natural parents' last
contact with the child and the attempt to regain custody increases, the
child may regard the parents with which he or she resides as psychological
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parents. The concept of "psychological parenting," which is gaining recog-
nition in the courts, emphasizes the mental health of the child in applying
the best interests standard. 147 The child's lack of contact with his or her
national culture may weigh against the natural parents because of the
difficulties associated with adjustment from an American family setting to
the former cultural setting. 148
Unlike parents, nonparent relatives of a refugee child do not benefit
from any presumption favoring their acquisition of custody. When a rela-
tive seeks custody after following a child to the United States, courts are
less likely to disturb the existing arrangements for the child than when a
parent seeks custody. This may be especially harsh for a relative who was,
for all practical purposes, the child's former custodian and psychological
parent. For example, the grandmother in Huynh Thi Anh claimed that the
four children in question had resided in her home in South Vietnam.
The numerous contested custody disputes resulting from the Babylift
may prove to be aberrations that do not recur. Perhaps because of the
Babylift experience, volags and the federal government have been careful
in subsequent migrations of minors to emphasize that these children are
not available for adoption. 149 Agencies that retain legal custody may be
committed to the goal of family reunification, and assist in transferring
custody to parents should they immigrate. ' 5 0
Repatriation
The repatriation of a refugee child causes tension between refugee immi-
gration principles and parental custody rights. Parental rights and family
unity are paramount values, but a refugee child by definition is in danger
of persecution if he or she returns to his or her country of origin or former
domicile. 151 The issue of repatriation arises in two settings. In the first, the
family and child have been separated by the child's admission to the
United States while the parents remain in the country of origin. Unlike the
custody actions discussed in the last section, such a suit seeking repatria-
tion has a strong basis for invoking federal jurisdiction.
Nguygen Da Yen v. Kissinger, ' 5 2 a class action seeking repatriation of Indo-
chinese children whose families remained in Vietnam, implies that courts
are willing to view federal involvement differently in the repatriation
context than in domestic custodial disputes. In this case, the court sus-
tained federal habeas corpus jurisdiction predicated on a constitutional
violation, the allegedly illegal physical and legal custody exercised by the
foster parents and adoption agencies. "While most private detentions
... do not rise to the level of constitutional violations, the governmental
involvement in facilitating and maintaining the allegedly illegal physical
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and legal custody ... presents that possibility here and habeas corpus is
proper." 153
Moreover, the court indicated in dicta that the government involvement
placed the children "in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States" within the meaning of the habeas corpus provision. 154 The
court of appeals reasoned that the "decision that the child is admissible
[had] the practical effect, absent court intervention, of precluding its return
to Vietnam.... [T]he governmental action restricts the child's freedom to
depart, and the government has the power to remedy the detention." 155
The absence of a state court remedy that would send a child out of the
country necessitates federal jurisdiction if the family is to be reunited by
repatriating the child. 156
It is not clear whether a refugee child may choose to remain in the
United States against his or her parents' wishes. No reported cases address
this issue. Policies reflected in case law and INS decisions seem to place
more importance on the parents' right to control the child's destiny than
the child's right to asylum or refuge. In the aftermath of the Vietnam
Babylift, INS authorities stated that the agency would revoke parole of
children whose parents demanded repatriation, and the children would be
returned to Southeast Asia if arrangements were possible. 157
A more unusual setting in which repatriation may arise involves fami-
lies located in the United States which plan to repatriate as a family unit.
In three separate cases, parents who intended to return to the Soviet Union
sought custody of a child who had been made a ward of the state.
In People ex. rel. Choolokian v. Mission of Immaculate Virgin, 158 the father had
voluntarily relinquished custody of his American-born children when he
became unable to care for them. The court denied his petition to regain
custody to move his children to Soviet Armenia. The denial was based on
the belief that the Soviet Union would not permit the children to leave
Soviet territory when they reached the majority age. "It is unthinkable that
an American court could permit this father to place his infant children in
such an irretrievable position." ' 5
9
In the second child custody case involving repatriation of a Soviet
family, In re Kozmin, 160 custody was restored to the parents. After the
parents were released from a mental institution, they sought to regain
custody of their children from the state and intended to return to the
Soviet Union. In awarding them custody, the court resolved the case strict-
ly on traditional principles. Since it found no reason to deprive the parents
of custody, the presumption favoring natural parents was determinative.
A similar case arose in 1980.161 The parents of Walter Polovchak
became disenchanted with the United States and desired to return to the
Soviet Union. After Walter ran away from home, the state of Illinois took
custody of him under a law 162 that allows a minor to become a ward of
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the state even if he is not a delinquent and even if his parents are neither
abusive nor neglectful. In addition, the INS approved Walter's petition for
political asylum.
The Polovchak parents brought proceedings in state court to regain
custody, challenging the constitutionality of the Illinois statute and the
hearing removing Walter into custody of the state. 163 In a separate action
in a federal district court, the Polovchaks are challenging the INS asylum
determination. 164 If the state loses custody, Walter's attorney plans to seek
a federal court judgment that the asylum status preempts any state action
in the matter. 165 If this suit should be filed, the court would probably have
to determine whether parental custodial rights are paramount to a child's
desire to remain in asylum in the United States. When the parents already
have legal custody, a grant of asylum probably does not override the
parents' desire to repatriate their child. Under international legal princi-
ples, the right to asylum is not an individual right, but a right of a sovereign
state to confer or deny asylum. 166 On the other hand, parents' rights to
control their children are well-established in U.S. law. There is authority
indicating that a parent's right to direct his or her child's upbringing is
constitutionally protected against unwarranted state infringement. 167
In general, the government may initially invade or terminate the parent-
child relationship only upon a showing of parents' gross misconduct or
unfitness, or other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the
child. 168 Should the grant of asylum permit a child to remain in the United
States against the wishes of his parents, then it would have the practical
effect of terminating the child's relationship with his parents. Ordinarily,
a parent's right to maintain this relationship cannot be cut off without due
process of law. 169 A grant of asylum to the child by the INS would hardly
meet this requirement. The INS itself denies that granting asylum should
affect the parents' rights. 170
More problematic is the case where the parents do not have custody and
seek to acquire it from a state agency. In this instance, there has already
been government interference in the parent-child relationship quite apart
from the interference arising from a grant of asylum. In determining
whether the parents' resumption of custody is warranted, the court makes
the child's welfare the paramount consideration. Attention to the best
interests of the child would seem to require consideration of whether a
parent would place the child in a position in which the child would poten-
tially be subject to persecution.
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THE EFFECT OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
Federal Responsibility for Care and
Maintenance of Unaccompanied Refugee
Children Under the Refugee Act
An important element of the Refugee Act of 1980171 is its authorization
of federal funding of child welfare services for unaccompanied minor
refugees. 172 Such permanent legislation should allay the financial fears of
state governments and voluntary agencies, and reduce placement delays.
The Act also deals with procedural matters. When an unaccompanied child
is in transit to the United States, or within the United States but as yet
unplaced, "the Director (of Refugee Resettlement) shall assume legal re-
sponsibility (including financial responsibility) for the child."1 7 3 The di-
rector is authorized to make necessary decisions to provide for the child's
immediate care. 174 This provision fills the gap in legal responsibility that
sometimes occurred in prior practice and ensures that someone is always
responsible for making decisions which affect the child's welfare.
The Act's effect on the procedures for transferring legal responsibility
from the director to state child welfare agencies is unclear. The Interstate
Compact procedure has been working so well that federal administrators
hesitate to upset that system. 175 Although the federal government is not
included within the Compact's definition of a "sending agency," this tech-
nical problem can be avoided if the federal government, as has been its
practice, contracts with a volag to effect placement. A volag is clearly a
"sending agency" 176 and the Refugee Act specifically authorizes the direc-
tor to contract with appropriate public or private nonprofit agencies in
order to carry out his or her legal responsibilities. 177 In effect, the Act may
simply serve to codify the practices of the recent resettlement of Indo-
chinese children.
The inadequacy of the Act in placing children who are admitted under
any status other than "refugee" is illustrated by the experience of the
Cuban children in 1980. Whether the Act should be amended to extend
federal benefits to an unaccompanied child admitted by parole depends on
the likelihood of a similar massive influx of immigrants. Clearly Congress
wishes to discourage the use of parole to admit aliens, although prior to
the passage of the Refugee Act, the executive branch regarded the use of
parole as the most effective means of admitting refugees in emergency
situations. Should child welfare benefits be extended to children admitted
under parole or a similar category created by the executive branch, the
financial burden would be negligible if the exercise of the executive's
discretionary power fell into relative disuse, while the benefit to individual
children would be great. If admissions by discretionary authority continue
apace, then the financial obligations of the federal government would
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exceed the expectations of Congress in enacting the Refugee Act. But past
experience indicates that, in any case, it will be the federal government that
ultimately pays for children admitted by executive fiat. Thus, federal re-
sponsibility for unaccompanied children should be extended to cover
unaccompanied children admitted by parole. Alternatively, the executive
branch should be more sensitive to the practical effects of admission under
a nonrefugee status. 178
The Effect of the Refugee Act
on Rights of the Natural Family
The Refugee Act specifies that placement of unaccompanied children will
proceed under the laws of the states. Because the legal relationships be-
tween unaccompanied children and their natural family were shaped by
state law prior to its enactment, the Refugee Act will have almost no effect
in this area. The only apparent change is in the interim period during
which the director of refugee resettlement is responsible for unaccom-
panied refugee children. Should a custody challenge develop in the interim
period, the federal government would be an appropriate defendant. How-
ever, custody suits by maternal family members who follow the child to
the United States seem unlikely, since federal policy has been to release
children from federal custody to parents or relatives whenever they are
located in the United States. The federal government, which cannot devel-
op the emotional ties foster parent custodians experience, will not contrib-
ute to custody contests. Possibly, though, the government would put up
more of a fight to retain custody if parents left behind attempt to have the
children repatriated. Still, the more probable development is that the natu-
ral family will attempt to immigrate to the United States at a later date. 179
CONCLUSION
To a degee matched by no other group of refugees, unaccompanied chil-
dren rely on Americans for economic, social, and emotional support as well
as legal protection. Recognizing the need of any child to be guided and
provided for by an adult, United States law foresees a continuity of cus-
todians until a child's majority. Because of improved procedures under the
Interstate Compact for Children and federal responsibility under the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980, custody of unaccompanied refugee children admitted as
refugees under the Act now mirrors this legal norm of continuous custody.
Once an unaccompanied refugee child has been placed in legal custody,
state courts apply a standard elevating the child's interests above other
considerations when determining whether custody should revert to the
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natural family members who later immigrate. This test may result in a
harsh outcome for the natural family if the court considers the psychologi-
cal attachment to foster parents, financial support, and effects of shifting
back to a family with a different cultural orientation. The potential severity
of court scrutiny is mitigated by the presumption that the child is better
off with his or her biological parents rather than parent substitutes. The
same presumption is probably determinative when parents seek repatria-
tion of the child. Thus, in adjustment of custody, too, where the question
is not so much one of continuity of care as quality of it, legal rules strive
to serve the special needs of refugee children. Refugee movements into the
United States are not extraordinary occurrences, and, with the passage of
the 1980 Refugee Act, U.S. law acknowledged this fact of contemporary
international life. While the regularity of migrations is not to be applauded
-reflecting, as it does, crisis and tragedy abroad-the regularization of
procedures for dealing with refugees is a salutary development. Refugee
children are the direct beneficiaries of the custodial procedures that have
developed of necessity in response to unabating crises.
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